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Banks play a special role as providers of informative signals about the quality and 
value of their borrowers. Such signals, however, may have a quality of their own as 
the banks’ selection and monitoring abilities may differ. Using an event study 
methodology, we study the importance of the geographical origin and organization of 
the banks for the investors’ assessments of firms’ credit quality and economic worth 
loans to U.S. firms over the period of 1980-2003. We find that investors react 
not if the loans are made by banks that are located outside the firm’s headquarters 
state. Investor reaction is, in fact, the largest when the bank is foreign. Our evidence 
suggest that investors value relationships with more competitive and skilled banks 
rather than banks that have easier access to private information about the firms. These 
results are applicable also to the European markets where regulatory and economic 
borders do not coincide and bank identities and reputation seem to matter a great deal. 
Keywords: relationship banking, bank organization, bank origin, loan announcement 
return
JEL Classification: G21, G32, H11, D80 
Abstract
positively to such announcements if the loans are made by foreign or local banks, but 
following loan announcements. Our sample comprises 986 announcements of bank 5
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Non-Technical Summary 
Previous literature has emphasized the special role of banks as providers of informative 
signals about borrowers’ private information. Given this view, equity investors assess the 
value and the credit quality of the borrower as increasing when bank loans are 
announced. These informative signals however are of different qualities, depending on 
the banks’ assessment abilities and reputation on the market. We investigate how various 
bank characteristics, in general, and banks’ geographical origin, in particular, affect 
investors’ reaction to loan announcements. The fact that investors react more/less to loan 
announcement signals depending on bank characteristics has received not enough 
attention yet in the literature. 
  We focus on publicly traded U.S. firms so we can easily observe informative firm 
equity values over time. Because publicly traded U.S. firms face fewer information 
asymmetries, they are less reliant on local bank financing than small businesses in 
emerging markets and have access to a wider menu of financing alternatives, including 
foreign bank loans. If markets are efficient, then abnormal returns provide direct signals 
about whether borrowing from foreign banks helps or hurts shareholders of the borrowing 
firms more or less than borrowing from local banks. 
If foreign banks only lend to very transparent firms, the observed abnormal 
returns following a foreign bank loan announcement should be close to zero, as investors 
already know the quality of the firm. If, however, foreign banks select their borrowers 
better than local banks, the abnormal returns following the loan announcements should be 
larger than those observed for local bank loans. If, on the other hand, local banks are 
more informed than foreign banks because of their geographical proximity for example 
the reverse should hold. 
    We find that when firms announce a loan from a foreign bank, the two-day 
cumulative abnormal return on the firm stock is on average 91 basis points (bps). In 
contrast, in-state loan announcements yield only 44 bps in excess returns, neighbor-state 
loans minus 20 bps and non-neighbor state loans 32 bps. This difference according to 
bank origin becomes even larger when we control for firm and loan characteristics and 6
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macro conditions. On the other hand, the difference seemingly decreases over time 
towards the end of the sample period. Overall, our results suggest that markets value most 
relationships with high quality, competitive, foreign lenders that seem to perform better 
in selecting and monitoring their clients, rather than local lenders that have easier access 
to firms’ private information. This difference between banks however, dissipates over 
time. These findings are of particular importance for the European context where 
regulatory and economic borders do not coincide and bank identities and reputation seem 
to matter a great deal. 7
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1. Introduction
A previous literature has emphasized the special role of banks as providing certification 
of their borrowers’ quality (James, 1987). Equity investors for example may perceive the 
credit quality and value of a firm to improve when it obtains a renewal of a bank loan 
(Lummer and McConnell, 1989). However, the certification itself can be of a varying 
quality, depending on the bank’s assessment ability and reputation (Billet, Flannery and 
Garfinkel, 1995). In this paper we investigate if the origin of the bank may affect the 
equity investors’ reactions to the bank loan announcements. That equity investors may 
react differently to the announcement of bank loans granted by local or foreign banks has 
not been investigated before as far as we know. 
  This apparent lack of evidence is somewhat surprising, as a fast developing 
literature has recently raised serious concerns about the willingness and ability of foreign 
banks to lend to domestic firms. Foreign banks may cherry-pick clients and be more 
reluctant than domestic financial intermediaries to lend to opaque borrowers for example 
(Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 2004). Hence, many firms may be permanently excluded 
from foreign banks’ financing (Mian, 2006). Credit to the private sector may 
consequently be lower in countries with widespread foreign bank presence (Detragiache, 
Tressel, and Gupta, 2008). 
But as argued by Giannetti and Ongena (2008) this may be too pessimistic a view 
of the existing literature. All firms possibly indirectly benefit from the entry of foreign 
banks. Foreign banks may select borrowers more judiciously and their presence may 
discourage local banks from earning rents from creditworthy firms to subsidize locally 
connected borrowers for example. However, directly comparing borrower selection by 
local and foreign banks may be difficult because the true borrower quality may remain 
unobservable.
  We therefore, and in contrast to the previously cited research, focus on publicly 
traded U.S. firms so we can easily observe informative firm equity values over time. 
Because publicly traded U.S. firms face fewer information asymmetries, they are less 
reliant on local bank financing than small businesses in emerging markets and have 
access to a wider menu of financing alternatives, including foreign bank loans. If markets 8
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are efficient, then abnormal returns provide direct signals about whether borrowing from 
foreign banks helps or hurts shareholders of the borrowing firms more or less than 
borrowing from local banks. 
If foreign banks only lend to very transparent firms, the observed abnormal 
returns following a foreign bank loan announcement should be close to zero, as investors 
already know the quality of the firm. If, however, foreign banks select their borrowers 
better than local banks, the abnormal returns following the loan announcements should be 
larger than those observed for local bank loans. If, on the other hand, local banks are 
more informed than foreign banks because of their geographical proximity for example 
the reverse should hold. 
  We rely on a sample of 985 bank loan announcements that were published 
between 1980 and 2003 and collected by Fields, Fraser, Berry, and Byers (2006). We 
augment their announcements with the origin of the bank gleaned from the BankScope
and Bank Regulatory databases. On the basis of firm and bank headquarters location, we 
distinguish between loans from in-state, neighbor-state, non-neighbor state, and foreign 
banks.
    We find that when firms announce a loan from a foreign bank, the two-day 
cumulative abnormal return on the firm stock is on average 91*** basis points (bps).
1 In 
contrast, in-state loan announcements yield only 44 bps in excess returns, neighbor-state 
loans -20 bps and non-neighbor state loans 32* bps. This difference according to bank 
origin becomes even larger when we control for firm and loan characteristics and macro 
conditions. On the other hand, the difference seemingly decreases over time towards the 
end of the sample period. Overall our results indicate that investors assess foreign banks 
to be more selective in financing firms than the domestic banks, but that this difference 
between foreign and domestic banks dissipates over time. 
   The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the relevant 
literature. Section 3 presents the methodology, while Section 4 describes the sample 
selection and the variables employed in our empirical analysis. In section 5 we analyze 
                                                 
1 As in the tables, we star the coefficients to indicate their significance levels:  *** significant at 1%, ** 
significant at 5%, and * significant at 10%. 9
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the cumulative abnormal returns on firms stock during bank loan announcements, first, in 
a univariate setting, then in a multivariate setting, and finally we discuss a number of 
robustness tests. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Bank Loan Announcements 
Equity market reactions to bank loan announcements have been studied extensively. 
Motivated by conjectures regarding the uniqueness of bank loans (Fama, 1985) and 
following work by Mikkelson and Partch (1986), James (1987) studies the average stock 
price reaction of firms that publicly announce a bank loan agreement or renewal. James 
finds that bank loan announcements are associated with positive and statistically 
significant stock price reactions that equal on average 193*** bps in a two-day window, 
while announcements of privately placed and public issues of debt experience zero or 
negative stock price reactions. This result holds independently of the type of loan, the 
default risk and size of the borrower. The results in the seminal paper by James (1987) 
are key for our current thinking of the role banks play in credit markets. 
Results in James (1987} spawned numerous other event studies (for a review see 
Degryse and Ongena, 2008). Lummer and McConnell (1992) for example find positive 
equity price reactions to loan renewals only, while Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1992) 
show that equity prices react significantly to both loan initiations and renewals, but only 
for small firms. More recently, Fields et al. (2006) find that equity price reactions to bank 
loan announcements have considerably decreased over time, possible due to increased 
competition and the changing nature of the banking sector. The impact, however, is still 
considerable for small and poorly performing firms. In line with the latter findings, 
Ongena, Roscovan, Song, and Werker (2008) find a similarly decreasing reaction of 
equity prices to bank loan announcements. They are also the first to document that bond 
price reactions are comparable in size. The authors show theoretically and empirically 
that contrary to bond prices, stock price reactions are independent of the borrowers’ 10
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credit quality, while bond price reactions for riskier and smaller firms are more likely to 
be negative.
2
  Most studies explain the magnitude of the loan announcement returns in cross-
sectional regressions using various firm and loan characteristics. Bank specific 
characteristics, however, have remained somewhat overlooked with the exception of 
James (1987) and Preece and Mullineaux (1994) who include bank type (bank versus 
nonbank), and Billet, Flannery and Garfinkel (1995) who investigate the importance of 
bank credit ratings for the estimated excess returns. They find that announcements of 
banks loans granted by lenders with higher credit ratings are associated with larger 
abnormal returns on the borrowing firms’ shares. Different from these studies we focus 
on the impact of bank origin. 
2.2. Foreign Bank Presence 
Why would bank origin matter for the assessment by equity investors of bank 
loan announcements? Local banks may have an informational and organizational 
advantage in screening and monitoring local borrowers. Information may deteriorate in 
quality across distance for example and loan officers working for a bank that is anchored 
locally may have stronger incentives for due diligence (similar to Berger and Udell, 2002 
and Stein, 2002). Foreign outside banks as a result either cherry-pick clients and only 
engage the most transparent ones or break even on a pool containing many low-quality 
firms (Rajan, 1992 and von Thadden, 2004). Mian (2006) for example shows that foreign 
banks that have their headquarters farther away from local branches focus less on 
informationally difficult but economically sound borrowers. In this case equity investors 
will react positively to the announcement of a bank loan granted by a local bank (unless 
the local bank manages to extract all informational rents) but will not react to 
announcements of foreign bank loans. 
Alternatively, foreign banks may be better and more selective in financing local 
firms and less subject to social and political pressure to cross-subsidize low quality firms. 
Foreign banks may have a better lending technology, organization or other competitive 
                                                 
2 Hence they provide an explanation for the results by Best and Zhang (1993) who relate firm’s 
announcement returns to firm’s risk and do not find statistically significant results.11
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advantage in screening or monitoring that allowed it to penetrate the local market. If this 
type of organizational or informational advantage is widely known to investors, 
announcements of loans to firms made by foreign banks may be followed by positive 
firm stock price reactions. 
To the best of our knowledge, the previous literature has ignored the market 
valuation of local versus foreign bank borrowing. However differences in lending 
technologies and specialization of local and foreign banks have been studied extensively 
especially for developing countries. Stiglitz (1993), Levine (1996), Claessens, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Huizinga (2001), Gelos and Roldos (2004), Micco, Panizza, and Yanez (2007), 
and Martinez, Soledad, and Mody (2004) study the effect of foreign bank entrance on 
domestic developing markets. They find significant improvements in the local financial 
system overall. Competition in the local banking markets intensifies, and the profitability 
of the local banks decreases. Interestingly, Levy-Yeyati and Micco (2003) find that in 
Latin-America competition actually softens following foreign bank entry, while Giannetti 
and Ongena (2008) find that foreign bank presence in Eastern European countries 
benefits all firms, with more pronounced effects for the largest firms and those less likely 
to be involved in relationship lending. 
The operating efficiency of banks has been analyzed in cross-country studies such 
as those by Mian (2007) and Micco, Panizza, and Yanez (2004). These authors find that 
foreign banks have lower operation costs and higher profitability than domestic banks, 
while state owned banks are less efficient in terms of costs and profitability when 
compared to either foreign or domestic banks. According to Degryse, Havrylchyk, and 
Jurzyk (2008), foreign banks charge, on average, lower rates to transparent, larger 
borrowers who appear to be predominant in their portfolios. Clarke, Cull, Martinez-Peria, 
and Sanchez (2008) show that only foreign banks with significant local presence in Latin 
America focus on small business lending. 
Most recently, Detragiache, Tressel, and Gupta (2008) build on an adverse 
selection model to study the effects of foreign bank entry in developing markets. In their 
model, foreign banks have a cost advantage over domestic banks in lending to larger, 
more transparent borrowers and a disadvantage in lending to smaller, more opaque firms. 12
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Their model suggests that, although possible, it is not necessarily the case that foreign 
bank entry leads to improved total lending, cost efficiency, and aggregate welfare. 
Interestingly, it is the more transparent firms who will always benefit from foreign bank 
presence, while the more opaque firms will either lose or remain indifferent. Hence 
whether firms benefit and how equity investors react differently to announcements of 
local and foreign bank loans is ultimately an empirical question. 
3. Methodology 
We run variations of market model regressions, where in the simplest case we regress 
measures of the realized stock returns for event firm i at date t, , on a measure of the 
realized daily return of a benchmark index,  . To compute abnormal returns, we 
augment the market model with a set of 
it R
Mt R
 1 2  W  daily dummy variables, , with  ikt D
W W W W , 1 ,..., 1 ,       k . The augmented dummies take the value of one for the event d
(inside the event window) and zero otherwise. The simplest specification we estimate 
takes the following form: 
ays
. , , t i D R R it
k
ikt ik Mt i i it       ¦
  
H J E D
W
W
      (1) 
We assume that the error terms are independent and have a mean zero. The 
estimated coefficients  ik J  measure the daily abnormal returns inside the event window. 
Contrary to the traditional two step approach for estimating abnormal returns, the one 
step approach we undertake has the advantage that the estimated abnormal returns and 
corresponding -statistics are correctly estimated using ordinary least square methods 
(Karafiath, 1988). We also estimate variations of (1) by estimating alternative market 
model specifications. The latter results are discussed in Section 6 where we focus on the 
robustness of our estimates. 
t
To calculate the cumulative abnormal returns, , we sum the estimated daily 
abnormal returns over various windows. These can be then tested for significance using 
Wald or Patell-Z tests. Finally, we relate the calculated cumulative abnormal returns to 
W i CAR13
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various firm and bank specific as well as other characteristics in a univariate and 
multivariate setting. Generally speaking, we estimate: 
i i i X B a CAR X W W W       ,       (2) 
where  is a matrix of firm and bank specific as well as other characteristics, among 
which our primary focus is on bank origin and organization variables, while 
i X
W  is the 
event window over which the abnormal returns have been aggregated. Since some firms 
have been granted multiple loans over the sample period, we are forced to drop the 
classical assumption of independence of error terms for different observations. For 
robustness, we assume that the errors are independent across firms but allow for 
correlation within firms. This assumption leads to traditional cluster regression estimates. 
4. Data and Sample Characteristics 
4.1 Bank Loan Announcements 
We obtain our loan announcements from Fields et al. (2006) who manually collected the 
largest sample of bank loan announcements that we are aware of. They searched all press 
releases in the Lexis/Nexis database for the period 1980-2003. For a detailed description 
of this dataset and a discussion of the sample selection issues we refer the reader to their 
paper.
The main advantage of relying on this sample is that the authors have 
comprehensively collected the name of the banks that participated in the loan deal, 
among a number of other variables. In the original sample that contains 1,111 loan 
announcements, 113 bank names and 34 firm identifiers are missing. We revisit the 
respective press releases in the Lexis/Nexis database and are able to identify another 27 
banks and 31 firms. We drop the observations with unidentifiable banks or firms and 
match the remaining observations on bank names with BankScope and Bank Regulatory, 
two datasets that are available in WRDS. The final match comprises 952 observations 
(match with BankScope) and 978 observations (match with Bank Regulatory). We will 
use the latter sample in robustness. 14
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The possibility to match our dataset with BankScope or Bank Regulatory 
databases is essential for our study. Both datasets allow us to identify the origin of the 
lending bank. This differentiation is possible since both databases provide us with the 
location of either the bank’s headquarters (Bank Regulatory) or its subsidiaries (Bank 
Regulatory). As we are able to extract the location of the firm’s headquarters from 
COMPUSTAT, also available via WRDS, we can measure firm-bank proximity. 
Given that we have access to two different bank datasets in this study, we are 
more confident about our results as we are able to carefully test for the robustness of our 
conclusions. However, the drawback is that in the Bank Regulatory set we are missing a 
lot of bank specific observations, while the BankScope data set starts only 1986. Both 
restrict our samples considerably. Table 1 defines the variables used in our study. We 
now turn to a detailed description and motivation for each of these variables. 
(Insert Table 1 here) 
4.2 Firm Characteristics
Panel A in Table 1 presents the firm specific variables employed in our study. The 
dependent variable is the average cumulative abnormal return on the firms’ stocks in 
various event windows around the bank loan announcements. We consider various event 
windows and denote the cumulative abnormal returns for each one of them by CAR(x,y),
where x and y denote the beginning and the end day of the event window respectively. 
We note that the cumulative abnormal returns equal on average 50 bps which is lower 
than the results presented in earlier bank loan announcement studies, but is in line with 
the recent findings of Fields et al. (2006) and Ongena et al. (2008). 
On the right hand side, we include typical measures of firm size, LNASSETS or 
LNMVE, as motivated by Slovin et al. (1992), to control for the existing informational 
asymmetries regarding the firm’s performance. Panel A in Table 1 presents the log 
transformations of these values. When adjusted for inflation (in 1992 U.S. dollars), we 
find that borrowers’ total assets had an average of 1,195 million U.S. dollars and a market 
value of equity of 818 million U.S. dollars, though these results are affected by a number 
of large outliers. The corresponding median values are 197 million U.S. dollars and 126 
million U.S. dollars, respectively. The change in total assets in the year prior to the 15
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1023
March 2009
announcement has been 0.5 million U.S. dollars on average with a median of 0.1 million 
U.S. dollars. 
Best and Zhang (1993) suggest that borrower risk plays an important role in 
determining the reactions to bank loan announcements. Ongena et al. (2008) develop a 
theoretical model and relate firm risk to both bond and stock price reactions around the 
bank loan announcements. To control for the credit quality of the borrowers in our 
sample, we include the standard deviation of firm stock returns in the year prior to the 
loan agreement as an independent variable. Our sample comprises relatively risky 
borrowers as the standard deviation on their stock returns is quite high with an average 
value of 3.62% and a median of 3.32% in the year prior to the loan announcement. 
Despite this risk (or because of it), Panel A in Table 1 shows that on average the firms 
have been quite profitable with an average of 10.61% and a median ratio of operational 
income to assets of 11.76%. Firm Tobin’s Q values have a median of 1.30 and an average 
of 1.64. Despite their riskiness, our firms appear to be relatively mildly leveraged, with 
median debt ratios of 22% and average value of 23%. 
James and Smith (2000) point out that loan agreements are particularly important 
for borrowers with an undervalued stock. We therefore also include the cumulative 
abnormal return on the firm stock during the last year prior to the announcement. Our 
equally weighted market-adjusted return in the year prior to the loan announcement is 
minus 1.05% on average and has a median value of minus 0.65%, which is consistent 
with the James and Smith’s (2000) conjecture. 
4.3 Bank Characteristics
To control for origin and organizational differences in lenders’ characteristics, we employ 
four mutually exclusive dummy variables INSTATE, NEIGHBOR, NONNEIGHBOR, 
and FOREIGN. These dummies are defined to be equal to one if the borrower’s and 
lender’s headquarters are in the same state, in a neighbor state, in a non-neighbor state 
(but still in the U.S.) or in a different country, respectively, and zero otherwise. The 
descriptive statistics presented in Panel B of Table 1 are for the data taken from the 
BankScope database. 16
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   12.90% of the loan agreements are between lenders and borrowers that have their 
headquarters in the same state, 7.80% between lenders and borrowers with the 
headquarters in a neighbor state, a majority of 53.00% between lenders and borrowers 
with headquarters that are not in the same state (but in the same country), while 26.10% 
of the agreements are between foreign banks and domestic (U.S.) borrowers. 
4.4 Loan Characteristics
Among the loan specific characteristics we employ and list in Panel C of Table 1, is the 
variable LNAMOUNT, that is defined as the natural logarithm of the loan amount in U.S. 
dollars. Loan size provides a measure of the importance of the deal for both the lender 
and the borrower and on the impact the announcement might have on the market 
valuation. While on average borrowers are granted loans of around 135 million U.S. 
dollars, the median value of the loan size is 30 million U.S. dollars. These amounts are 
considerable and can reach on average 10% of firm asset values. 
Lummer and McConnell (1989) classify bank loans into new loans and renewals. 
Our right hand side dummy variable, RENEW, captures such differences in the loan 
deals. Of the 986 loan deals in our dataset, 52% (513) are renewals and 47% (473) are 
new loans. Lummer and McConnell (1989) similarly report that 49% of their sample are 
loan renewals. 
Preece and Mullineaux (1996) find significant differences in syndicated and non-
syndicated bank loan announcement returns with the syndicated loan announcement 
returns being considerably smaller and rather insignificant. To control for such 
differences we include a dummy variable, SYNDICATED, which equals one if the loan 
deal has multiple lenders and equals zero otherwise. Of the 986 loan deals in our sample 
65% (639) are syndicated. Preece and Mullineax (1996) similarly report that 72% of the 
loans in their sample are syndicated loans. 
4.5 Other Control Variables
James and Smith (2000) note that abnormal returns to bank loan announcements differ 
with the size of the relative credit spreads. To control for such differences we employ a 
variable SPREAD defined as the differences between the AAA and BBB credit spreads 17
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in the month of the loan announcement. Our results show that on average the spread 
between AAA and BBB bonds is 1.01% with a median value equal to 0.88%. 
5. Empirical Results 
We estimate market model regressions as shown in equation (1) to compute abnormal 
returns around bank loan announcements for a sample of 986 firms during 1980-2003. 
We first start by describing the behavior of abnormal returns around announcement dates 
in a univariate setting and then link the cumulative abnormal returns for various event 
windows to bank, firm and loan characteristics and macro conditions in a multivariate 
regression analysis. 
5.1 Univariate Results 
The results of our event study for the entire sample, and for in-state, neighbor state, non-
neighbor state, and foreign bank loans separately are presented in Table 2. For each of 
these groups, we present both, the results from the equally-weighted as well as the Fama-
French factors regressions. 
(Insert Table 2 here) 
Looking at the first two columns we observe that the market reactions for the whole 
sample of announcements are generally limited to the announcement day and are, on 
average, as large as 49 bps for the equally weighted regressions and 52 bps for the Fama-
French regressions, both economically and statistically significant at 1% confidence 
levels using the Wilcoxon rank test. These magnitudes of loan announcement returns are 
considerably smaller than those reported in James (1987) but are very much in line with 
those reported in Preece and Mullineaux (1996), James and Smith (2000), Fields et al. 
(2006), and Ongena et al. (2008). 
Columns 3 to 10 of Table 2 break the sample into in-state, neighbor state, non-
neighbor state, and foreign bank loans. These results are already more insightful as they 
show significant differences between the average loan announcement returns across the 
four groups. In particular, the largest day-0 average abnormal returns are for the in-state 
loans. These are economically as large as 105 bps or 111 bps for the equally-weighted 18
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and Fama-French regressions, though with a somewhat “lower” level of statistical 
significance (5%). 
The second group with largest average loan announcement returns is the foreign 
bank loans group, presented in Column 9 and 10 of Table 2. These are economically 
smaller than those for the in-state loans at 68 bps and 73 bps for the equally weighted and 
Fama-French regressions respectively, both statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Columns 5 to 8 of Table 2 present the day-0 average loan announcement 
abnormal returns for the neighbor and non-neighbor state loans. While for the first of the 
two groups the average day-0 abnormal returns are both economically and statistically 
insignificant, for the latter, the abnormal returns are economically much smaller at 36 bps 
for the equally-weighted and Fama-French regressions, and are statistically significant at 
the 5% level. 
These preliminary results already point out that there are significant differences in 
market valuations of bank loan announcements when bank origin and organization 
characteristics vary. To provide further evidence that this is the case, we present in Table 
3 the cumulative abnormal returns for various event windows, for both equally-weighted 
and Fama-French regressions. 
(Insert Table 3 here) 
The results in Table 3 provide more insights on the behavior of market reactions 
to bank loan announcements across different bank origin and organizational structures. In 
particular, we observe that on average the cumulative abnormal reactions for all event 
windows considered are around 50 bps, mostly statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Again these results are in line with recent studies that have tested for various aspects of 
bank loan announcement returns. 
When the sample is split into the four groups depending on the location of firm 
and bank headquarters, we observe, in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, that the in-state loan 
announcement returns are again the largest, but they do not appear to be significant for 
any but the (-1, 0) event window and only at 10% confidence levels. The neighbor state 19
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cumulative loan announcement returns presented in columns seem to be negative and 
insignificant for all event windows. 
Contrary to these results, columns 5 and 6 of Table 3, show that the non-neighbor 
state loans display positive cumulative abnormal returns that vary from 30 to 45 bps 
depending on the event windows considered. The results for this particular group are very 
close to the results for the entire sample. 
Most importantly, the cumulative abnormal returns on foreign bank loan 
announcements appear to be most significant and largest among the four groups 
considered. In particular, the results vary from 86 to 172 bps for various event windows 
and are statistically significant at the 1% or 5% levels. 
So far, our univariate results convincingly show that the market reactions to bank 
loan announcements vary according to bank origin, and are predominantly positive when 
lenders are from abroad. As suggested earlier, Field et al. (2006) shows that loan 
announcement returns have decreased considerably over time. In order to provide some 
perspective on this time pattern, we provide the cumulative abnormal returns for different 
time periods in Table 4. Since the announcements in our sample, as collected by Fields et 
al. (2006), come from news wires carrying a precise time stamp we focus on what occurs 
in the (0, +1) event window (the results are robust to using alternative event windows). 
(Insert Table 4 here) 
Panel A of Table 4 presents the average cumulative abnormal returns for the 
entire sample as well as for different time periods grouped by decade (1980-1989, 1990-
1999, and 2000-2003) and bank origin (in-state, neighbor-state, non-neighbor state loans, 
and foreign). The cumulative abnormal returns declines significantly over the 24 year 
period for the neighbor state loans, non-neighbor state loans, and the foreign loans but not 
for the in-state loans. In particular, the abnormal returns for all loans are positive and 
statistically significant only for the first sub-period. During this first decade significantly 
positive abnormal returns are observed only for the foreign bank loan announcements. 
Non-neighbor state announcements also result in positive cumulative abnormal returns 
but these are much smaller and statistically significant only at the 10% level.  20
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Contrary to these findings, returns around announcements of in-state loans 
increase during the 24-year sample period from being negative and statistically 
insignificant in the first period to about 300 bps in the last 4 years of our sample period. 
The results for the last sub-period are statistically significant at the 5% level. These 
results show, in fact, that there is no clear time pattern in the size of the loan 
announcement returns during our sample period among the four groups, but rather, 
market reactions have shifted gradually from valuing loans made by foreign banks during 
the first sub-period to valuing local, in-state bank loans during the last sub-period. These 
results are, in fact, not surprising in light of the findings of Petersen and Rajan (2002), 
who document that the distance between firms and banks has considerably increased over 
time. 
To provide some further evidence on the time pattern in the bank loan 
announcement returns across the four groups considered in this study, we present in 
Tabel 4, the cumulative abnormal returns for the (0, +1) event window on a 5-year 
interval (Panel B) and yearly (Panel C) basis. 
The results for the 5-year sub-periods show that there is no consistent pattern 
behavior in the market reactions to bank loan announcements over the 24-year period 
considered in our sample. However, it is interesting to note that in-state and foreign bank 
loan announcements have been consistently opposite in sign in all but the period of 1994-
1999. For neighbor and non-neighbor state loans the results are inconclusive as in most 
the time periods we find no significant cumulative abnormal returns. 
The cumulative abnormal returns presented on a yearly basis in Panel C of Table 
4, show, consistently with the previous findings, that there has been a shifting pattern in 
the market reactions to in-state and foreign bank loans. In particular during the earlier 
years, the market reactions to foreign loans were positive, while negative for the in-state 
loans. In the latter years, however, the market reactions to foreign loans have become 
negative and positive for the in-state loans. These results however, should be interpreted 
with caution given the high volatility in the computed cumulative abnormal returns over 
time together with limited significance levels due to a small number of observations 
within each of the considered groups. These results could be sample specific, but as 21
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Fields et al. (2006) show the characteristics of their and hence our sample are very much 
consistent with those of James (1987) and Lummer and McConnell (1989) and hence are 
more likely to be generally valid. 
So far our results show that although overall the size of the loan announcement 
returns appear has decreased over time, this is not necessarily the case for all bank 
origins. In particular, our results show that while foreign loan announcement returns have 
decreased over time, market reactions to in-state loans have increased in the latter years. 
These results suggest that changes in the banking and market competition have not 
completely eroded the informational advantage that banks have, as Field et al. (2006) 
suggest, but rather have shifted the informational advantage from some type of banks to 
another. The univariate results, however, might not necessarily reflect the changes in 
market valuations of bank loan announcements, but rather changes in lender 
characteristics or sample composition. To overcome such issues we explore our data in a 
multivariate framework in the following subsection. 
5.2 Multivariate Results  
Tables 5-8 present our multivariate results. We regress the cumulative abnormal returns 
on firm stocks (for various event windows) on a number of explanatory variables that 
prior research has found to explain the market reaction to bank loan announcements. Our 
primary interest is in assessing the bank origin dummies, but we also control for various 
proxies of firm size, change in the value of firm assets, pre-announcement firm 
performance, firm risk and capital structure, as well as loan characteristics and 
macroeconomic conditions. We turn now to the discussion of our results. 
(Insert Table 5 here) 
Table 5 presents the results of our multivariate models where the dependent 
variable is the 2-day cumulative abnormal return for day (-1, 0). Models 1-8 provide 
important insights on how different origin and organizational structures of lenders affect 
the cumulative abnormal returns on borrowers’ stocks. Given our univariate results, 
where we have shown that the announcement returns are the lowest when the lender and 
the borrower are in neighbor-states, we take this group as our reference group and include 
only the dummies for the in-state loans, non-neighbor state loans, and the foreign loans. 22
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The estimates of the coefficients of the INSTATE, NONNEIGHBOR and 
FOREIGN dummy variables are positive and statistically significant in all specifications 
at 10% confidence or less, except for Model 4. Model 4, in fact, is troublesome due to 
multicollinearity issues between LNASSETS and LNAMOUNT of 72%, between 
STDRET and LNAMOUNT of -42%, and between SYNDICATE and LNAMOUNT of 
52%. The insignificance of estimates is not due to limited number of observations in the 
variable LNAMOUNT, as we obtain significant estimates when we regress the same 
specification without LNAMOUNT on the smaller sample where we observe 
LNAMOUNT. Except for model for, our estimates of INSTATE, NONNEIGHBOR, and 
FOREIGN seem to be robust among all models considered. 
The effects of bank origin and organizational variables are also economically 
significant. First, we observe that across all models in Table 5 the magnitude of the 
coefficients next to INSTATE and FOREIGN are the largest amongst the bank dummies 
while the NONNEIGHBOR coefficient seem to be the lowest. These results are 
consistent with our conclusions in the univariate analysis and show that when lender’s 
headquarters is located either abroad or in the same state as borrower’s headquarters, the 
cumulative abnormal return on firm stock will go up by 15 bps as compared to the 
abnormal return on a firm which has been granted a loan from a bank with its 
headquarters in a neighbor state. If the location of bank’s headquarters is in a non-
neighbor state, the loan announcement return will increase by 10 bps as compared to our 
reference group. These results imply that the average cumulative abnormal returns are 
30% larger when the lending bank’s headquarters is not in a neighbor state. 
In Models 2–8 we employ two measures for firm size: LNASSETS and LNMVE. 
In line with Slovin, Johnson, and Glascock (1992), we find that the cumulative abnormal 
returns on borrower’s stock decrease with size. This effect is statistically significant at 
10% confidence level when we include LNASSETS as a control variable and at 1% 
confidence levels when our control for firm size is LNMVE. These results are 
economically significant as they suggest that the effect of an average size firm will 
decrease the cumulative abnormal return by 5-10 bps. 23
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In Models 3, 4, 7, and 8, we control for firm credit quality by including on the 
right hand side of the regression the standard deviation on firm stock in the year prior to 
the announcement. In line with Ongena et al. (2008) we find that the cumulative 
abnormal return on firm stock increases in firm risk. This effect is statistically significant 
at 1% in Model 3, but its significance decreases to 10% as we extend our model with 
additional controls. The economic impact of firm risk is non-negligible, as for an average 
firm, the cumulative abnormal return on firm stock increases by 10 bps for one standard 
deviation change in our proxy for rim’s risk, similar in magnitude to the results in 
Ongena et al. (2008). 
In Models 5-8 we extend our specifications by controlling for alternative risk and 
performance measures as well as loan and macroeconomic characteristics. Although, in 
many cases the signs are in line with theoretical predictions, the remaining results have 
little, if any, economic or statistical significant. This, however, changes as we switch to 
an alternative specification where we regress the cumulative abnormal return on the firm’ 
stocks for days (0, +1) on similar controls. The results are presented in Table 6. 
(Insert Table 6 here) 
In table 6 we observe that while the economic and statistical significance of the 
INSTATE and NONNEIGBOR dummies has decreased considerably, the significance of 
the FOREIGN dummies has remained the same. Additionally, we observe an increase in 
significance for alternative risk and performance characteristics of the borrowers. In 
particular, in Models 5, 7, and 8 of Table 6 the return on firm assets appear to negatively 
impact the size of the loan announcement returns. This effect is significant at 1% in all 
specifications considered. Its economic significance, however, is rather low and equals 
around -3 bps for the average firm. 
Recent theories suggest that foreign and domestic banks specialize in serving 
different types of borrowers depending on existing informational asymmetries. To control 
for such differences in technology, we include an interaction term in Models 7 and 8 in 
Table 6 and find a statistically and economically significant negative impact. 
Specifically, the cumulative abnormal return increases, ceteris paribus, by 10 to 15 bps 24
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when it is granted by a foreign bank. However, when the firm’ size increases and there 
are less informational asymmetries involved this effect is much smaller. 
5.3 Robustness
We employ two types of robustness tests. First, we alter the event windows over which 
we compute abnormal returns, and, second, we perform similar regressions on an 
alternative sample, collected from the Bank Regulatory database. The results for 
alternative event windows are presented in Tables 7 and 8, while the results for the 
alternative sample are not reported. 
(Insert Tables 7 and 8 here) 
The results in Table 7, where the dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal 
return for the three-day window (-1, +1), are virtually unchanged. The estimates next to 
the foreign dummy are both statistically and economically significant and very similar to 
our previous results. When we increase the event windows, however, we observe 
statistical significance only in a limited number of specifications for the FOREIGN 
dummy. As the event window opens contamination most likely decreases the economic 
and statistical importance of our results. 
When we employ the alternative dataset, we obtain virtually the same results. The 
only difference however is that Bank Regulatory does not report the location of the 
bank’s headquarters, but rather the location of its subsidiaries in the U.S.. Qualitatively, 
however, our results are unaltered, in the sense that only the closest and the farthest away 
banks lead to significantly positive abnormal returns during loan announcements. 
6. Conclusions and Implications
We document substantial differences in the cumulative abnormal returns on firm stock 
during bank loan announcements when lender’s origin varies. Over our sample period, 
firms have experienced quite heterogeneous reactions to bank loan announcements from 
very negative to highly positive and significant. When we group, however, the 
cumulative abnormal returns by bank origin and organization dummies, constructed using 
the BankScope dataset, we find that the abnormal returns have been consistently positive 
when foreign bank-firm relationships and in some cases to closes local firm-bank 25
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relationships. We show that these findings are robust to alternative specifications, various 
event windows and alternative definitions of bank origin and organization. Overall, our 
results suggest that investors value most loans from high quality, competitive, foreign 
lenders that seem to perform better in selecting and monitoring their borrower, rather than 
local lenders that may have easier access to private corporate information. 
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